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Abstract: This article assesses compliance with biodiversity compensation on New Zealand’s conservation 
land. Of the 261 Department of Conservation (DOC) concessions for commercial activity searched, only about 
15% included compensation provisions. A sample of 20 concessions of that 15% suggests 68% achieve full 
compliance. Our results suggest compliance is influenced by factors such as habitat and activity type, protected 
area category, and whether a concession holder has pending concessions and/or renewals. Inconsistencies 
in compliance monitoring, enforcement, and reporting merit attention. Although New Zealand’s rate of 
full compliance with biodiversity compensation conditions is higher than that observed in other countries, 
compensation is rarely requested. This rarity and the lack of national guidelines on how and what to ask for 
in compensation, suggest that compliance with compensation once requested, and the quality and consistency 
of requests, limit biodiversity protection. Jurisdictions engaging in biodiversity compensation should attend 
not just to compliance, but also to the requests themselves. To do so, they should develop clear guidelines, 
enforcement strategies, and reporting processes.
Keywords: biodiversity compensation; compliance; concession; Conservation Act; Department of Conservation; 
enforcement; implementation; monitoring; New Zealand; policy
Introduction
Biodiversity compensation employs positive conservation 
actions to mitigate the adverse effects of resource use and 
development (Burgin 2008; Gordon et al. 2011; Pilgrim et 
al. 2013). It is a prominent and growing practice on public 
and private lands around the world (Burgin 2008; Madsen 
et al. 2011) as it promises to advance development and 
conservation simultaneously (Ten Kate et al. 2004; McKenney 
& Kiesecker 2010; Bull et al. 2013; Linterman 2014). While 
growing in popularity, biodiversity compensation is fraught 
with complications, particularly in biodiversity offsets, a 
subset of compensation (Walker et al. 2009; Maron et al. 
2012; Brownlie et al. 2013). One such complication, and our 
focus, is inadequate compliance monitoring and compliance 
outcomes (Gibbons & Lindenmayer 2007; Bull et al. 2013).
In New Zealand, compliance with compensation is fretted 
over more than measured (Tonkin and Taylor 2012; Brown et 
al. 2013; Linterman 2014). A 2017 report by the Environmental 
Defence Society found that New Zealand’s environmental 
compliance regimes are less than robust throughout the 
sector (Brown 2017). This issue represents an unquantified 
threat to biodiversity (Bekessy et al. 2010; Brown et al. 2013) 
and undermines the credibility of biodiversity protection 
(Hornyak & Halvorsen 2003). Reasons for poor monitoring 
and compliance of biodiversity compensation include lack of: 
(1) a regulatory framework for biodiversity compensation; 
(2) monitoring resources; (3) clarity in responsibility for 
monitoring; (4) training in biodiversity compensation 
monitoring; (5) clear and effective methods for measuring 
biodiversity; and (6) political will (Walker et al. 2009; Tonkin 
and Taylor 2012; Rega 2013).
Biodiversity compensation occurs ad hoc under two of New 
Zealand’s most prominent biodiversity laws, the Conservation 
Act 1987 and the Resource Management Act 1991 (RMA) (see 
http://legislation.govt.nz). Currently, there is no national policy 
guiding implementation and evaluation (Madsen et al. 2011; 
Brown et al. 2013), but we defined compensation as additional 
conservation actions that went beyond what would be required 
under the traditional avoid-remedy-mitigate approach. Brown 
et al.’s (2013) study was the first systematic evaluation of 
compliance with biodiversity compensation on predominantly 
private land, under the RMA. Ours is the first study on public 
conservation land, under the Conservation Act. 
Administered by the Department of Conservation (DOC), 
the Conservation Act governs the conservation estate – one third 
of New Zealand’s landmass. While the Act favours conservation 
over development on public conservation land, DOC will allow 
commercial activity in some form through a concession. DOC 
can place conditions on a concession, requiring compensation 
or remediation in some form for detrimental effects that were 
impossible to avoid, remedy, or mitigate (DOC 2014). This 
article explores geographic, procedural, regulatory and social 
influences on compliance, and recommends improvements for 
compensation to better avoid biodiversity loss. 
Methods
We examined compliance with biodiversity compensation 
conditions in DOC concessions. An agreement with DOC 
allowed data collection for no more than 20 concessions, due 
to time constraints for field inspections and the commercially 
sensitive nature of the concessions database. Each of the 20 
concession cases required up to five compensatory conditions, 
for a total of 32 conditions. We had to exclude four conditions 
due to insufficient data. In total, our sample included 28 
conditions.
New Zealand Journal of Ecology (2018) 42(1): 0-0 © New Zealand Ecological Society. 
DOI: 10.20417/nzjecol.42.4
2 New Zealand Journal of Ecology, Vol. 42, No. 1, 2018
Measuring compliance
In the absence of national policy goals for biodiversity 
compensation, we used the terms of concession conditions 
themselves to measure compliance. Compliance was assessed 
on a binary scale, of ‘full compliance’ (1) or ‘less than full 
compliance’ (0). We used mixed-methods to score compliance 
because the literature suggests agencies’ poor compliance 
monitoring and record-keeping (Hornyak & Halvorsen 2003; 
Reiss et al. 2009; Brown et al. 2013) would have rendered 
a desktop analysis of records difficult and of limited utility. 
Methods were modelled on compliance studies for the New 
Zealand government (Tonkin and Taylor 2012) and academic 
studies of compensation (Breaux et al. 2005; Brown et al. 
2013). They included: a review of concession contracts and 
monitoring files; a field assessment where possible; consultation 
with key DOC staff; spatial analysis; and investigation into 
financial data held by DOC. We then reconciled information 
from various sources to assess compliance. Compliance scores 
reflect only compliance with the stated condition, not the 
sufficiency of the condition. 
To examine relationships among variables in a small 
number of observed cases, we used General Linear Models, with 
a binary response variable and a Bernoulli error distribution, 
to investigate the possible influence of the following on 
compliance: geographic characteristics such as conservation 
land category, habitat type, activity type, and procedural, 
regulatory and social characteristics such as condition type 
and applicant type.  
Sampling and stratification
To select the 20 concessions, we conducted a stratified 
random search of the approximately 2300 active South 
Island concessions that were approved between 1992 and 
2013. We first selected the concession activity types that are 
both most common and most likely to include compensation 
(telecommunications, structures, access (typically access 
ways into the conservation estate), and grazing). Within 
each category, we searched a random segment of up to 
30% and chose five compensation cases per category. The 
criteria for choosing a case were: (1) the concession cited 
negative effect(s) on the biophysical environment such as 
resource extraction, species loss, vegetation clearance, land 
alteration, or discharges to land or water; (2) the concession 
included negotiation for biodiversity compensation under 
the Conservation Act and these compensation requirements 
were specific and enforceable; and (3) the concession was old 
enough for the permitted activity, structure, or facility to be 
complete or under way.
Limitations
We could investigate only a small sample of active biodiversity 
compensation conditions of particular activity types on New 
Zealand’s South Island, constraining the power of our findings 
and recommendations. There is much scope for a larger and 
broader national study, an international comparison, and a 
study on the sufficiency of DOC’s compensation measures. 
More specifically, we note the following limitations of 
this study: we relied on the completeness and accuracy of 
the information provided by DOC; the number of variables 
investigated and the limits of DOC’s concessions database 
affected the representativeness of the sample; despite 
considerable effort to ensure compliance scores accurately 
reflected multiple sources of information, scoring was to some 
extent subjective.
Results
Of the 261 concessions searched, approximately 15% asked for 
compensation. Among that 15%, a sample of 28 compensation 
conditions from 20 concessions was assessed. Of those 28, 68% 
achieved full compliance (score 1) and 32% achieved less than 
full compliance (score 0). Despite expectations that compliance 
on public conservation land would be higher than on private 
land (Dasgupta et al. 2000), our finding of 68% compliance 
under the Conservation Act is statistically indistinguishable 
from Brown’s (2013) finding of 65% under the RMA. 
The most common form of compensation requested was 
additional weed or pest control beyond that which DOC already 
performs. Other requirements included compensation payments 
to DOC, environmental premiums (payments intended to 
reflect the environmental impact of the concession activity on 
the land), planting, and species management programmes (i.e. 
management and monitoring of a particular species). Many of 
the compensation cases involved the exchange of dissimilar 
ecological values, such as weed control in exchange for the 
removal of habitat. 
Variations in compliance
Of the geographic characteristics of concessions and 
compensation conditions (Table 1), compliance varied with 
both activity type (P = 0.062) and habitat type (P = 0.064), the 
latter echoing international findings (Race & Fonseca 1996; 
Breaux et al. 2005; Quigley & Harper 2006). The lowest 
complying activity was grazing; and the lowest complying 
habitat was grasslands; given the prevalence of grazing on 
grasslands, there is quite likely some interaction between 
the two. 
Compliance varied suggestively (P = 0.093) with category 
of protected area. Protected area categories follow DOC’s 
land classification categories (1–4; reflecting the International 
Union for Conservation of Nature’s (IUCN) protected area 
categories), which are used to calculate environmental 
premiums for telecommunication concessions and fall along 
a scale of legal protection, such that the higher the protection 
status (Category 1, national park, nature reserve, ecological 
area, national reserve, wilderness area, wildlife sanctuary or 
sanctuary area) witnessed higher compliance. It is notable that 
all grazing concessions in this study were on category 4 land; 
thus, reasons for low compliance among grazing concessions 
also apply to concessions on category 4 conservation land.
None of the procedural or regulatory characteristics 
exhibited significant or suggestive relationships with 
compliance (Tables 2, 3 & 4). Of the social characteristics, 
only the presence of pending applications for concessions 
exhibited a significant relationship with compliance (P = 0.037). 
Discussion
Compliance and conservation
While 68% full compliance might appear admirable, DOC 
requested compensation in only approximately 15% of the 
observed concessions initially examined. Further, there 
is no national policy guiding when and what to ask for in 
compensation, making it difficult to assess when and where 
DOC is asking for too little or too much. Thus, in considering 
compensation, it is worth thinking about more than just rates 
of full compliance. 
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Table 1. Compliance scores by land characteristics.
Geographic characteristics of the condition Cases  Compliance score   P-value
__________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________
Habitat type (LCDB4)  0 (less  1 (full) Percent of 
  than full)  cases in full  
    compliance 
__________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________
Forest  18 3 15 83% 0.064*
Grassland  8 5 3 38% 
Others 2 0 2 100% 
__________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________
Activity type     
Access 8 4 4 50% 0.062*
Grazing 5 3 2 40% 
Structure 15 2 13 87% 
__________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________
Conservation land     
Category 1 6 0 6 100% 0.093*
Category 2 5 2 3 60% 
Category 3 12 4 8 67% 
Category 4 5 3 2 40% 
__________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________
** Significant result (p= <0.05)
* Suggestive result (p= <0.1)
Table 2. Compliance by procedural characteristics.
Procedural characteristics of the condition  Cases 0 1 Percent of P-value 
or concession    cases in full  
    compliance 
__________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________
Administrative condition (paper-based, such as  11 3 8 73% 0.655 
a payment or conservation covenant) 
Non-administrative condition (action-based, such  17 6 11 65% 
as planting, species management or monitoring,  
or weed/pest control)  
__________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________
Professional ecologist involved  12 3 9 75% 0.480
Professional ecologist not involved 16 6 10 63% 
__________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________
Concession notified (under the Conservation Act) 18 4 14 78% 0.135
Concession not notified 10 5 5 50% 
__________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________
Application processed by Christchurch office   6 3 3 50% 0.276
Application processed by Dunedin office 10 4 6 60% 
Application processed by Hokitika office     12 2 10 83% 
__________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________
Concession approved pre-2010 23 7 16 70% 0.682
Concession approved post-2010 5 2 3 60% 
__________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________
Concession reviewed 9 3 6 67% 0.926
Concession not reviewed 19 6 13 68% 
__________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________
** Significant result (p= <0.05)
* Suggestive result (p= <0.1)
One way to achieve high compliance is to ask for very 
little (Brower 2008). This approach has implications for 
conservation on the ground. Perfect compliance with a low rate 
of compensation request might be no worse for conservation 
than low compliance with a high rate of request. Further, there 
is the question of whether the compensation requests themselves 
were sufficiently rigorous. High compliance with insufficient 
compensation requests risks yielding a hollow victory. In other 
words, the constraint on protecting biodiversity lies not only 
in the compliance with compensation once requested, but also 
in the sufficiency of the request itself.
Observed constraints on compliance
Five institutional factors within DOC were observed during 
the study that might be inhibiting compliance. Taken together, 
they suggest that some of the imperfections in compliance rates 
stem from within the agency, rather than just from recalcitrant 
concessionaires. These factors were anecdotally observed 
and reported, not quantified. However, as they affirm others’ 
predicted and observed constraints on compliance (Matthews 
& Endress 2008; Tonkin and Taylor 2012; Rega 2013), they 
bear further investigation
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Table 3. Compliance by regulatory characteristics.
Regulatory characteristics of condition  Cases 0 1 Percent of  P-value 
    cases in full  
    compliance 
__________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________
Action required before activity 11 3 8 73% 0.616
Action required during activity 12 5 7 58% 
Action required after activity 5 1 4 80% 
__________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________
Bond required 8 2 6 75% 0.604
Bond not required 20 7 13 65% 
__________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________
Monitoring required 17 7 10 59% 0.192
Monitoring not required 11 2 9 82% 
__________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________
Long concession duration (>30 years) 8 3 5 63% 0.208
Medium concession duration (15–30 years) 9 1 8 89% 
Short concession duration (<15 years) 11 5 6 55% 
__________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________
Action one-off 13 3 10 77% 0.335
Action ongoing 15 6 9 60% 
__________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________
** Significant result (p= <0.05)
* Suggestive result (p= <0.1)
Table 4. Compliance by applicant characteristics.
__________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________
Social characteristics of condition Cases 0 1 Percent of  P-value 
    cases in full  
    compliance
__________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________
Applicant is an individual  6 2 4 67% 0.869
Applicant is a private organisation or company 14 5 9 64% 
Applicant is a public organisation or company 8 2 6 75% 
__________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________
Applicant has pending concession applications  5 0 5 100% 0.036** 
and/or renewals 
No pending concession applications and /or  23 9 14 61% 
renewals  
__________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________
Frequent DOC visits 12 3 9 75% 0.480
Infrequent DOC visits 16 6 10 63% 
__________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________
Frequent public visits 11 5 6 55% 0.228
Infrequent public visits 17 4 13 76% 
__________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________
Concession transferred to a new concessionaire 7 2 5 71% 0.814
Concession not transferred to a new  21 7 14 67% 
concessionaire  
__________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________
** Significant result (p= <0.05)
* Suggestive result (p= <0.1)
First, there does not appear to be a systematic and 
coordinated approach to compliance monitoring of concession 
conditions in New Zealand. The level of compliance monitoring 
varied according to the type and scale of activity for which 
a concession had been granted. Grazing concessions were 
often monitored annually by DOC staff (although this was not 
always the case) while telecommunications concessions usually 
received only a single inspection, despite the compensation 
measure requiring more frequent checks. Access also played 
a large role; concessions along major state highways received 
more frequent visits because of routine drives along these areas. 
Per anecdotal evidence, much compliance monitoring is ad 
hoc and reactive because of public observations or complaints. 
Second, as our results show, compliance reporting and 
data management are inconsistent. Only seven of the 20 
cases had written records of compliance monitoring. DOC 
staff provided further information for 16 cases. For the four 
remaining, staff turn-over and loss of institutional knowledge 
explain the lack of information. Furthermore, of those seven 
cases where compliance information was recorded, records 
for each took several forms (email chains, invoices, memos, 
official inspection reports). These records were then kept either 
on paper and/or electronic file, with the former filed in several 
DOC offices. The core concession files were generally kept at 
the main service centres where the concessions were issued, 
yet the monitoring files were held in the various local offices 
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where the monitoring was done. Financial records pre-2003 
were archived in an old finance system to which there was 
limited access. These approaches to data management make 
it difficult to accurately assess compliance. As such, the final 
compliance scores determined in this study are a best estimate. 
Reliance on concessionaires to self-monitor and report also 
made compliance reporting and data management problematic. 
Self-monitoring can be poorly conducted and compliance 
information can be misrepresented (Tonkin and Taylor 2012). 
Third, lack of communication inhibits compliance. For 
example, two compensation payments were never paid because 
permissions officers did not communicate with finance staff. 
Permissions staff signed contracts, yet finance staff never 
sent invoices. 
Fourth, lack of resourcing might contribute to the underuse 
of DOC’s authority (Scholz 1984; Friesen 2003). Scholz (1984) 
explains that regulatory agencies can spread limited resources 
further by being flexible in acceptable levels of compliance. 
An example of this was some weed or pest control conditions 
where DOC stated that concessionaires were in full compliance 
(the last inspection often several years prior), yet a site visit 
revealed the opposite. 
Lack of resourcing cannot always explain low compliance, 
especially when the contract stipulated that the concessionaire 
should pay for DOC staff time for monitoring. Friesen (2003) 
expands on resourcing and the cost of enforcement, predicting 
that a regulated entity will only comply with a regulation 
when compliance costs are lower than the expected penalty 
for violation. Frequent monitoring and strict enforcement 
strategies, including high fines, are often proposed as solutions 
(Friesen 2003; Wu 2009). Eckert (2004), Earnhart (2004) 
and Rousseau (2008) all confirmed the deterrent effect of 
increasing inspections. However, Friesen (2003) makes the 
point that, even with low inspection probabilities and small 
fines, compliance can still be high. Achieving high compliance 
with low enforcement expenditure requires innovative, non-
traditional approaches, such as targeted enforcement (Scholz 
1984; Friesen 2003).
A fifth constraint on compliance and compliance 
monitoring is its level of priority. The New Zealand 
Biodiversity Strategy advocates the importance of ‘appropriate 
mechanisms to enforce policies and actions to conserve and 
sustainably use New Zealand’s biodiversity…including 
education, surveillance, compliance monitoring, enforcement 
programmes and appropriate sanctions for non-compliance’ 
(DOC 2000). However, DOC does not yet appear to have a 
published compliance monitoring and enforcement strategy. 
Comparisons to previous studies 
At 68%, compliance with biodiversity compensation measures 
appears higher on New Zealand conservation land than 
overseas. For example, a study of compensatory wetland 
mitigation in Massachusetts, USA found 54% of wetland 
projects did not comply with the State's wetland regulations 
(Veneman & Brown 2011). Further, a study of habitat 
compensation under the Canadian Fisheries Act 1985 found 
that of 124 developments associated with fish habitat were 
non-compliant with conditions (Harper & Quigley 2005). 
An environmental auditing study of artificial waterways in 
Western Australia found a similar non-compliance rate of 37% 
with conditions related to the mitigation of adverse effects 
(Bailey et al. 1992).
Two significant variations in compliance we observed 
resembled national and international findings. First, we found 
that grazing concessions had the lowest compliance, echoing 
Brown’s (2013) finding that agricultural consent conditions 
under the RMA achieved the lowest rates of compliance (4.8% 
compliance, far lower than our observations). Second, we found 
that compliance rose with higher levels of protection under 
IUCN protected area categories 1–4, affirming the predictions 
of Neyer and Zurn (2001).
Several of our findings and observations confound existing 
literature. The presence of pending applications for concessions 
did vary suggestively with compliance, but not in the direction 
expected. We expected a significant relationship between 
compliance and a concessionaire’s pending application or 
renewal because frequent exposure to regulatory agents can 
improve compliance (Friesen 2003; Shimshack 2007). We 
found the opposite – those with pending applications exhibited 
lower compliance than those without. 
Similarly, four of the expected trends we failed to find 
confound previous findings and expectations. (1) Dasgupta et 
al. (2000) and Brown (2013) found higher compliance amongst 
public concessionaires than private individuals and interests and 
attributed it to higher public scrutiny of public organisations; we 
did not find this pattern. (2) Employing a professional ecologist 
is often assumed to improve design and implementation of 
conservation measures, including compensation (Binning 
2000; Denny 2011; Brown et al. 2013). We did not find this, 
perhaps because s/he was not always retained throughout 
the implementation of the compensation measure. (3) A 
bond was expected to enhance compliance. A bond acts as 
insurance where, to get the bond back, a concessionaire must 
comply with conditions. While we observed a 10% increase 
in compliance for concessions with a bond we again found no 
statistical relationship, perhaps because bonds were rare (in 
only 6 of 20 concessions), low, or never paid. (4) Heightened 
public participation and scrutiny for notified concessions was 
expected to improve compliance (Morrison-Saunders & Early 
2008), but also did not.
Conclusion and recommendations
We conclude that two types of factors limit biodiversity 
protection within the practice of biodiversity compensation 
on New Zealand’s public conservation land: (1) compliance 
with compensation once requested and (2) the quality 
and consistency of the requests. Jurisdictions engaging in 
biodiversity compensation should attend not just to compliance, 
but also to the requests themselves. To do so, they should 
develop formal, enforceable national guidelines on biodiversity 
compensation, compliance monitoring and enforcement 
strategies, and a consistent approach to compliance reporting.
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